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This paper calibrates real and hypothetical willingness-to-accept estimates elicited for
consumer goods in a multi-unit, random nth-price auction. Using a within-subject experimen-
tal design, we find that people understated their real willingness to accept in the hypothetical
regimes, framed both as demand and non-demand revealing. After controlling for person-
specific effects, however, hypothetical and real statements are equivalent on the margin.
Ž.  2001 Elsevier Science USA
1. INTRODUCTION
Some evidence suggests that people tend to overstate their real willingness-to-pay
Ž. 3 WTP in hypothetical markets. This observation triggered a search for a calibra-
tion function to correct systematic bias between intentions and actions in valuation
exercises.
4 But much less attention has been paid to the relationship between real
Ž. and hypothetical willingness-to-accept WTA compensation, and little is known
about the in-sample calibration of WTA offers.
5 This is surprising since the recent
hypothetical valuation literature has been driven by compensatory natural resource
1 We thank Kerry Smith for his excellent comments and diligence in working with us to improve the
manuscript. Carol Mansfield, John Horowitz, an Associate Editor, and an anonymous referee also
provided very helpful comments. Seminar participants at the World Congress of Enironmental and
Resource Economists in Venice, Italy also made useful suggestions. The University of Central Florida’s
STAR program, NOW, the Dutch Science Foundation, and the National Science Foundation provided
financial support. Apinya Thumaphipol and Priti Manek ably assisted during the experimental sessions.
2 Address correspondence to: John A. List, Economics Building, Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0023; E-mail: JList@ag.arizona.edu.
3       See for example, Bohm 8 , Bishop and Heberlein 3 , Dickie et al. 18 , Seip and Strand 50 , Neill
   et al. 44 , Fox et al. 22 , List and Shogren 37 .
4      See Blackburn et al. 7 , Fox et al. 22 , List and Shogren 37 , Mansfield 41 , and the National
   Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 45, 46 . Also see Randall’s 47 critique of calibration.
5 Between-sample comparisons of hypothetical and real WTA offers include, amongst others, Bishop
      and Heberlein 3 , Bishop et al. 6 , Brookshire and Coursey 10 , and Smith and Mansfield 52 . We are
unaware of any studies that use within-sample data to calibrate hypothetical and real WTA offers.
Although there is no evidence that indicates within-sample procedures are superior to between-sample,
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Ž damage assessment, which is closely tied to WTA measures of value e.g., Exxon
. Valdez and the Prince William Sound .
This paper uses panel data from a lab valuation experiment to calibrate in-sam-
ple real and hypothetical WTA compensation to surrender holiday gifts. Our
specific goal is to observe patterns in WTA calibration for market goods with
intangible qualities to further efforts aimed at finding generalizations about
behavior that can eventually convert experimentation into theory. In this regard,
Ž. we address two questions: 1 do hypothetical WTA offers differ across demand
Ž. Ž revealing random nth price auction and non-demand revealing open-ended
. question elicitation schemes? Nohypothetical offers were unaffected by the
framing of choice. This finding provides further support that differences found in
hypothetical valuation exercises cannot be explained away with the argument that
Ž. people find it difficult to answer open-ended questions; and 2 do hypothetical and
real WTA offers differ? Yesestimates suggest that subjects understated their real
WTA in both hypothetical scenarios; the ratio of mean real to mean hypothetical is
about 1.5. After controlling for subject-specific effects, however, we find that the
marginal calibration factor decreases to approximately 1.05, which is not signifi-
cantly different from unity. Hence, on the margin, hypothetical and real statements
are equivalent: a one-dollar increase in a hypothetical valuation statement is
associated with a one-dollar increase in actual value.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a broad
overview of the existing experimental work that includes hypothetical and actual
valuation statements. Section 3 includes a description of the data, hypotheses, and
empirical methods. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. PREVIOUS WORK
We first set the stage with a brief poll of the key studies in the calibration
literature. Table I summarizes the observed relationship between real and hypo-
thetical values.
6 The top panel of Table I presents a chronological ordering of
WTP studies that report both hypothetical and actual statements. This line of
 research began with Bohm’s 8 seminal experimental lab study which compared
bids in hypothetical and actual experimental markets that elicited subjects’ stated
value to preview a Swedish television show. His results suggest people moderately
overstate their actual values when asked a hypothetical question. Subsequent lab
Ž  research has generally supported Bohm’s findings e.g., Bishop and Heberlein 3 ,
    Seip and Strand 50 , Neill et al. 44 , Frykblom 24 , Fox et al. 22 , List and
   Shogren 37, 38 , and Balistreri et al.2 .
Ž  Exceptions to this set of results are not difficult to find e.g., Dickie et al.1 8 ,
 . Sinden 51 ; but taken as a whole the evidence suggests that the average person
seems to exaggerate his or her actual WTP across a broad spectrum of goods with
vastly different experimental parameters. For instance, the ratio of hypothetical-
to-actual overbidding, which ranged from 2.2 to 3.5 for baseball cards, falls between
the calibration factors observed for irradiatednon-irradiated pork and water color
Ž    paintings and maps see List and Shogren 37 , Fox et al. 22 , and Neill et al.4 4i n
. Table I . These results are within the range of calibration factors, 1.0 to 10.0,
Ž  . observed in earlier work see Diamond and Hausman’s overview 17 , and rein-
6  See Foster et al. 21 for a non-experimental comparison of real and hypothetical WTP statements.
Ž   . We do not include ‘‘cheap-talk’’ approaches in Table I e.g., Cummings and Taylor 16 , List 34 .CALIBRATION OF WTA 221
force the argument that people tend to overstate their actual WTP when con-
fronted with hypothetical questions. Given that the received literature derives
value estimates using quite heterogeneous experimental methods, understanding
the relationship between real and hypothetical values is difficult. Nevertheless,
data from the top panel of Table I suggest that attempts to bridge the gap
statistically might be impossible since calibration factors appear to be good-specific.
7
This finding is supported in related work on the relationship between WTA and
Ž  . WTP Horowitz and McConnell 29 , and provides an indication that calibration
functions are good-specific.
Researchers have spent considerably less energy on understanding the relation-
ship between WTA measures of value. The bottom panel of Table I indicates that
experimental evidence from this relatively small lot of studies is mixed. Bishop and
associates found that Wisconsin goose hunters’ overstated their actual WTA to sell
goose-licenses; deer hunters’ in a sealed-bid auction understated their actual WTA
to sell deer-permits, while hunters in a dichotomous choice institution overstated
 their real WTA. Coursey et al. 13 found that people overstated their actual WTA
to experience a drop of the bitter-tasting sucrose octa-acetate; Smith and Mans-
 field’s 52 field results suggest that real and hypothetical WTA statements for the
opportunity to spend time in a second set of interviews on an undisclosed topic are
statistically indistinguishable. Much like the WTP studies in the top panel of Table
I, these results suggest that the real-hypothetical WTA gap might be good-specific.
3. DATA, HYPOTHESES, AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
To provide initial insights into the realhypothetical WTA relationship from a
 within-sample design, we use data from List and Shogren’s 38 three-stage,
multi-good auction administered at the University of Central Florida. Stage 1:
 hypothetical open-ended sureysubjects answered Waldfogel’s 55 survey, in which
they stated ‘‘the amount of cash such that you are indifferent between the gift and
the cash’’ for each of their 1996 Christmas gifts, e.g., a person who received ten
gifts submitted ten hypothetical WTA offers. Stage 2: hypothetical auctiona
monitor asked subjects to again state their hypothetical selling price for each gift in
the context of the random nth-price auction.
8 Stage 3: actual auctionthe monitor
7  But, see the results in List et al. 35 , which suggest that similar commodities may have calibration
functions that are not statistically different.
8 After the instructions were read, the monitor ran a candy bar pre-auction to give the subjects some
Ž  . experience with the random nth price auction see, e.g., Melton et al. 42 . The auction works as
Ž. Ž . follows: i for each gift received, a subject states his or her selling price; ii all gifts from each subject
Ž. are pooled to create the set of total available gifts; iii all gifts are rank-ordered from lowest to highest
Ž. Ž selling price; iv the monitor selects a random number uniformly distributed between 2 and 21 the
.Ž . Ž. most gifts received by a subject ; and v the monitor purchases the n  1 lowest priced gifts and pays
the nth lowest price for each gift. We should note that a multi-good, uniform price auction does not
necessarily inherit the same demand revealing properties as a second-price or nth price auction in
Ž  . which subjects can only sell one gift Vickrey 54 . For example, truth-telling can be a non-unique Nash
Ž equilibrium in a multiple-unit, uniform price auction, but in general this may not be the case e.g.,
 . Ž Forsythe and Isaac, 20 there is an incentive for ‘‘demand reduction’’ on units after the first see
  .  Miller and Plott 43 , Franciosi et al. 23 . Although List and Lucking-Reilly 36 found significant
Ž. demand reduction in two-unit, two-person uniform-price auctions for high valued goods $40$70 ,
Ž demand reduction essentially disappeared when the number of bidders increased to 5 Engelbrecht-
 . Wiggans et al. 19 . We therefore do not concern ourselves with demand reduction since we have 36


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1LIST AND SHOGREN 224
ran the actual random nth-price auction, in which each subject submitted his or
her real selling price for each gift. All subjects knew they might potentially have to
sell the gift to the monitor if they made one of the nth lowest offers.
9 There were
no announcements of experimental Stages 2 or 3 until the actual day they were
run; hence subjects were unaware that a real auction would occur after the first
two stages, mitigating any strategic effects. After accounting for attrition, our final
sample consisted of 244 gifts across 36 recipients. The gifts that were offered were
quite heterogeneous, and included automobiles, perfumes, a beer intake facilitator,
and various pets including a dog, horse, and an iguana. The most common gift
types were clothing, compact disc players, compact discs, and jewelry.
We use these WTA Christmas gift data to examine three questions related
narrowly to non-market valuation and broadly to rational choice in the lab. First,
does the institutional frame matter for hypothetical WTA offers? Previous lab
work examining WTP data has found mixed evidence regarding whether the frame
Ž   matters to hypothetical bidders e.g., Neill et al. 44 ; Frykblom 24 , and Balistreri
 . et al. 2 . Also, the limited work that compares hypothetical and actual WTA
statements has used between-sample designs and has yielded largely mixed results
Ž  . see, e.g., Bishop and Heberlein 5 and the cites therein . We address this framing




HR, where HOE and HR are the hypothetical 0
open-ended and hypothetical random nth offers.
Second, do actual and hypothetical WTA offers differ? As noted previously, the
few out-of-sample WTA studies provided mixed results. We use two hypotheses to
Ž. address the potential hypothetical-real WTA gap: 1 the unconditional calibration







HR, where RR denotes 00
10 Ž. real random nth-price auction; and 2 the no-bias calibration hypothesis examines
whether hypothetical offers are consistent with real economic commitments. Since
we have panel datamultiple offers across numerous subjectsour regression
approach to test the no-bias calibration hypothesis controls for unobserved individ-
ual attributes and data dependencies that cannot be accounted for in tests of
sample means or pooled ordinary least-squares regression models. Given that
subjects received an unequal number of Christmas gifts, we use an unbalanced
panel data model to estimate the WTA calibration functions:
A    H   , i  1,2,..., N; g  1,2,...,G,1 Ž. ig i ig ig
where A represents stated WTA from the real random nth-price auction for the ig
ith subject’s gth Christmas gift, H is the hypothetical open-ended or hypothetical ig
random nth-price auction WTA statement for the ith subject’s gth gift,  are i
estimated fixed or random effects, and  is the well-behaved error term. The ig
no-bias calibration hypothesis, using both sets of hypothetical data as the indepen-
dent variable, is H
No-bias:   0;   1, where  and  are defined above. 0 ii
Rejecting the no-bias hypothesis suggests that hypothetical WTA offers are incon-
sistent with real economic commitments.
9 The random price was 4, and the monitor made arrangements with the sellers to purchase the
three lowest valued gifts each priced at the fourth lowest value.
10 An unconditional test holds nothing constant across subjects or gifts.CALIBRATION OF WTA 225
Ž. Ž . We estimate Eq. 1 using pooled ordinary least-squares OLS , fixed effects
panel data, and random effects panel data models. Both fixed and random effects
models control for unmeasured heterogeneity that pooled OLS ignores. Random
Ž. effects estimates of Eq. 1 yield coefficients that are not conditioned on unmea-
sured person effects, whereas fixed effects estimates yield coefficients conditioned
on the unmeasured characteristics. Fixed effects estimates are inefficient since they
only consider within-person variation. Yet, if the person effects are correlated with
hypothetical WTA responses, random effects estimates are inconsistent, while the
within estimator remains unbiased and consistent. We test for consistency using a
 Hausman 26 test when comparing estimates from fixed and random effects
models.
Our third hypothesis considers the nature of calibration functions across com-
modities. Previous work suggests statistical bias depends on the characteristics of
Ž   .Ž . the good Fox et al. 22 , List and Shogren 37 . Extending Eq. 1 , our good-neutral
Ž. hypothesis, H :    j , tests whether goods have heterogeneous calibration 0 ij
functions. We test this hypothesis by clustering goods into three categories based
Ž. on estimated market value. Two related points justify this approach: i Table I
suggests that intangible qualities of a good matterthe more distant the good is
Ž. from an ordinary market good, the larger the calibration factor; and ii the good’s
value seems to matter as well, as suggested by a recent comparison of WTP and
Ž  . WTA for goods of different values Horowitz and McConnell 29 .
We construct a pragmatic, ad hoc decision rule to split the data into three groups
Ž. Ž . low- stated market value  $50 , medium- $50  value  $150 , and high-
Ž. value  $150 valued gifts. Our logic in constructing the three groups proceeded
as follows: we wish to split the sample by the intangible nature of each good as
suggested by past work; and since each subject also provided a sentimental
component of each gift, we focus on sentimental value since goods with more
intangible qualities tend to have larger sentimental value. In addition, since stated
sentimental value is highly correlated with stated market value, each gift was
grouped by the subjects’ stated market value. This procedure allows us to run an ex
post validity test in which we compare these categories with posted prices from a
JC Penney 1997 catalogue. For those goods that are listed in the catalogue, the
validity test indicates that ex ante and ex post clusters yield similar groupings.
We test the good-neutral hypothesis by estimating
A     H   DH  DH  , ig i 1 ig 2 Li g 3 Mi g i g
i  1,2,..., N; g  1,2,...,G,2 Ž.
Ž. where A , H ,  , and  are defined above, and DDis a dichotomous ig ig i ig L M
Ž. variable that equals 1 if the good is in the low- high- valued category, 0 otherwise.
Ž. Equation 2 uses the high-valued goods as the baseline group and therefore the
heterogeneous calibration function hypothesis becomes: H :     0, which 02 3
can be tested via an F test.
11
11 To preserve degrees of freedom and focus on slope changes, we restrict the subject-specific effects,
 , to be equal across the three categories of goods. iLIST AND SHOGREN 226
4. RESULTS
Ž Table II presents summary statistics, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for matched
. pairs of the equivalency of the WTA distributions, and unconditional estimates of
the calibration function for each of the three valuation methods. Mean offers in
the overall sample range from $95.77 to $136.87 per gift in the three designs. Mean
TABLE II
Summary Statistics and Non-Parametric Tests of Equivalency
Hyp. Actual Hyp. Actual
random random auction Actual auction
nth- nth- vs. auction vs.
Hyp. price price hyp. vs. hyp. hyp.
survey auction auction survey auction survey
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon Wilcoxon
Mean Mean Mean test test test
Mean bid
aa Overall $95.77 $96.34 $136.87 4752 9570 7376
Ž. Ž. Ž. N  244 $12.28 $12.48 $15.36 z  0.66 z  5.76 z  5.62
a Low-valued $28.44 $30.10 $21.46 569 1429 1722
Ž. Ž. Ž. goods $2.47 $2.90 $1.13 z  2.39 z  2.77 z  2.08
N  109
aa Medium- $67.70 $67.15 $77.25 588 719 696
Ž. Ž. Ž. valued goods $7.55 $7.43 $2.72 z  0.25 z  3.99 z  3.74
N  72
aa High-valued $244.33 $244.28 $404.67 252 11 19
Ž. Ž. Ž. goods $41.20 $42.08 $44.04 z  0.78 z  6.02 z  5.93
N  63
Mean calibration factors
Overall 1.01 1.42 1.43
Low-valued 1.06 0.71 0.75
goods
Medium- 0.99 1.15 1.14
valued goods
High-valued 1.00 1.66 1.66
goods
Ž. Notes: 1 Standard errors in parentheses;
Ž. 2 Wilcoxon test is a signed-rank test for matched pairs across gifts. Since the number
of paired observations is larger than 30, the large-sample z-test is used. The large sample
z-test’s null and alternative hypotheses are given by:
H : Two sampled populations have identical probability distributions. 0
H : The probability distribution for population A is shifted to the right or to the left of a
that for population B.
Ž Ž Ž . .. Ž Ž .Ž z values are computed as follows: z  W  nn 1 4  nn 12 n 
.. 12 1 24 . Where n is the number of non-tied differences between the two samples;
Ž. 3 Mean calibration factor ratios are calculated as the top value in the column
header divided by the lower value in the column header. For example, mean bid ratio
Ž. under the fifth column labeled actual auction ersus hypothetical auction , is computed as
Ž. mean actual auctionmean hypothetical auction .
a Significantly different values at the 1% level.CALIBRATION OF WTA 227
responses in the three value categories range from $21.46$30.10, $67.15$77.25,
and $244.28$404.67 per gift. We now analyze our hypotheses in turn.
4.1. Framing Does Not Affect Hypothetical Values
HI HOE HR Ž First, we cannot reject the framing hypothesis, H :W T A  WTA see 0
. Table II . Although mean offers differ, we cannot reject the hypothesis that stated
values in the hypothetical survey were derived from the same parental population
Ž as values from the hypothetical auction see Table II Wilcoxon test, W  4752
Ž. . z  0.66 . This finding is consistent across value categories and suggests the
institutional frame does not universally affect hypothetical valuations. If it is
meaningful to know which hypothetical mode best approximates real values, this
result suggests the gap between intentions and actions cannot be explained away by
arguing that people had difficulty answering an open-ended question. Other WTP
Ž   . studies find similar results e.g., Neill et al. 44 and Frykblom 24 . In a much
 different context, Rutstrom 48 finds some behavioral differences between alterna- ¨
tive incentive-compatible institutions for eliciting home-grown values.
4.2. Distributions of Hypothetical and Real Offers are Different
Second, we reject the unconditional calibration hypothesishypothetical and real
WTA offers differ significantly, not controlling for subject effects. The bottom
panel of Table II presents the mean WTA ratio across designs. In the overall
sample, hypothetical offers underestimate real offersthe ratio of mean actual to
mean hypothetical is about 1.4. These differences are statistically significant at the
 Ž. Ž.  p  0.01 level W  9570 z  5.76 ; W  7376 z  5.62 , implying revealed
values in the actual auction are not derived from the same parental population as
revealed values in the two hypothetical treatments. In general, these results hold
across commodities of different valueone exception is the calibration factors for
low-valued goods, which are in the range of 0.75 and imply that hypothetical
statements are greater than actual statements.
The calibration factors in Table II suggest that bias increases with the market
value of the good. This finding is consonant with previous studies and suggests the
further a good is from an ordinary private good, the greater is the tendency for
subjects to mis-state their true value. Even so, the range of bias observed in Table
II suggests that for most goods people understated their true WTA when asked a
hypothetical WTA valuation question. Given that many practitioners view WTA
measures as the upper bound on value for incremental changes in a good or service
Ž  . e.g., Cummings et al. 14 , this finding may imply that hypothetical offers could
actually represent a lower limit on this upper bound.
4.3. Conditional Calibration Factors Do Not Depend on the Market Value of the Good
Ž. Table III presents panel data regression estimates of Eq. 2 for ordinary least
squares, and fixed and random effects models using both hypothetical WTA
institutions as the independent variable. When comparing coefficient estimates it is
 important to note that Hausman 26 tests of the null hypothesis of zero correlation
between hypothetical offers and the subject-effects indicate the orthogonality
assumption underlying the random effects estimates is violated in both regressionLIST AND SHOGREN 228
TABLE III
Fixed Effects Estimation Results for Calibration Functions
Open-Ended Survey Hypothetical Auction
Fixed Random Fixed Random
Variable OLS effects effects OLS effects effects
aa a a Constant 91.3  61.8 94.7  69.3
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 7.5 3.5 7.8 4.1
aa aaa a Hyp. offer 0.96 1.08 1.01 0.95 1.05 0.99
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. 20.8 24.9 25.3 20.9 24.5 25.1
aa a a Hyp. offer*D 1.97 0.22 1.03 2.14 0.46 1.27 L
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž. Ž.  5.6 0.6 3.2 5.9 1.3 4.0 2
aa a Hyp. offer*D 1.02 0.30 0.68 1.03 0.32 0.71 M
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž . Ž. Ž. Ž.  5.2 1.5 3.9 5.2 1.7 5.2 3
2 R 0.68 0.84 0.66 0.67 0.83 0.67
2 Adj. R 0.67 0.80  0.67 0.80 
aa Ž. F   0  5.7 5.4  i
Ž. Ž . Ž . d.f. 35,205 35,205
aa Ž. LM   0 37.3  35.4 i
Ž . Ž. Ž. d.f. 1 1
aa Hausman 27.5  27.0
Ž . Ž. Ž. d.f. 3 3
N 244 244 244 244 244 244
Ž. Notes: 1 Dependent variable is actual offer in the random nth-price real auction;
Ž. Ž . 2 D indicates low-valued goods value  $50 ; D indicates medium-valued goods LM
Ž.Ž . $50  value  $150 . High-valued goods value  $150 are omitted from the equation and
represent the baseline group;
Ž. 3 Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses under coefficient estimates.
a Significant at the 0.01 level.
Ž 2Ž. . models at conventional significance levels  3  27.5, and 27.0 . This result
suggests the error components model yields inconsistent and potentially biased
coefficient estimates. Accordingly, we focus on estimates from the fixed-effects
models.
Although the raw statistics in Table II imply calibration factors critically depend
on the good’s value, regression estimates in Table III paint a much different
picture. Estimates in Table III suggest the slope coefficients on the two value
Ž. categories  and  are individually not different from zero at conventional 23
significance levels in either model.
12 Further, we cannot jointly reject H :    02 3
Ž.  0 at the 95% level F  1.2 open-ended; F  1.6 hypothetical auction , suggest-
ing the slope of the regression calibration function is not different across our three
12 For the high-valued baseline category, we observe that the estimated coefficients on both
hypothetical offers are significant at the p  0.01 level. In the hypothetical WTA open-ended survey,
the point estimate in column 2 implies that a $1 increase in the hypothetical offer increases the real
offer in the random nth-price auction by $1.08, which is not significantly different from $1 at the
p  0.01 level. We find a similar result in the hypothetical random nth-price auction fixed effects
Ž. specification column 5 . Point estimates imply that a $1 increase in the hypothetical random nth-price
offer increases the real offer by $1.05, which is not significantly different from $1 at the p  0.01 level.CALIBRATION OF WTA 229
categories of goods as clustered by market value. Thus, for this particular cluster-
ing rule, we cannot reject the good-neutral hypothesis.
13
Although point estimates of the slope terms in each value category are not
different from one another at conventional levels, F-tests presented in Table III
reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of unmeasured subject-specific effects at
Ž. the p  0.01 level F  5.7; 5.4 . These results suggest that individual-specific
intercepts are different from one another at conventional significance levels,
leading us to reject the no-bias calibration hypothesis for both model types. This
finding supports the conjecture that there is an individual-specific, systematic
Ž component in the error term that may lead to bias in hypothetical responses see,
    . e.g., Mansfield 41 , Andreoni 1 , Herriges and Shogren 27 .
4.4. A Person Understates a Real Offer if He is Older, aM a n , or Had Receied
More Gifts
Recent studies have suggested that respondent characteristics and attitudes may
partly determine whether, and by how much, a person’s hypothetical statement
Ž  . differs from his or her real statement Mansfield 41 . If within-person bias
significantly affects the calibration function, the overall relationship between
hypothetical and real offers should account for individual-specific effects in the
regression model. Our results in Table III suggest that individual-specific factors
are important in the relationship between real and hypothetical reported valua-
tions. Given that the fixed effects component of the regression captures any
time-invariant subject specific characteristics, we perform an exploratory probe to
test for any systematic pattern in the individual effects.
To carry this task out, we use the estimated  as the dependent variable in the i
linear regression model,
    X   ,3 Ž. ii i
Ž. where  are the estimated fixed effects from Eq. 1 ,  and  are the estimated i
intercept and slope parameters, X are attributes hypothesized to influence the i
fixed effects, and  is a well-behaved error term. Evidence from the psychology i
literature suggests that individual response strategies may be a function of personal
Ž  . characteristics see Krosnick’s review 33 . As such, we consider four measurable
Ž. attributes in X AGE, GENDER  1 male, 0 female , FAMILY INCOME, and i
the number of gifts, GIFTS, that person i could sell in the actual auction.
14
13 This result suggests that there are not strong linearities in the relationship. As a robustness test,
we also experimented with grouping the goods according to the JC Penney’s broad categorization of
Ž. Ž. Ž. Ž. goods: 1 clothing, 2 toys and collectibles, 3 home and leisure, 4 jewelry, and a catch-all category,
Ž. Ž 5 miscellaneous, for any good that does not fit into one of the first four categories e.g., beer-intake
. facilitator . Under this grouping system we find statistical evidence that the nature of the good matters
in that we can reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous slope terms at the p  0.05 level. Since we
find qualitatively similar results on the margin, we do not present these results, but make them available
upon request.
14 To obtain information on the effects of respondent characteristics we could also estimate a model
Ž. Ž. Ž that combines Eqs. 2 and 3 . One approach would be to make Hypothetical value  Actual
.Ž . value Actual value  fX   , where X includes AGE, GENDER, FAMILY INCOME, and ii i
GIFTS. Given that we would not be able to control for other important static factors using this
approach because the rank condition would be violated if we included fixed effects in the model, we opt
for our two-step regression model.LIST AND SHOGREN 230
TABLE IV
Determinants of the Fixed Effects Component of the Calibration Function
Mean Open-ended survey Hypothetical
Ž. Variable standard deviation survey auction
aa CONSTANT  285.7 277.5
Ž. Ž. 1.8 1.8
AGE 24.22 6.3 6.1
Ž. Ž. Ž. 7.0 1.5 1.5
GENDER 0.58 99.3 105.3
Ž. Ž . Ž . 0.50 1.5 1.6
ba GIFTS 6.78 14.9 14.3
Ž. Ž . Ž . 3.99 2.0 1.9
FAMILY $68,472 0.12E-03 0.11E-3
Ž. Ž . Ž . INCOME $90,385 1.1 1.0
2 R  0.23 0.22
2 Adj. R  0.13 0.12
N 36 36
Ž. Ž. Notes: 1 Dependent variable is estimated fixed effect  from Eq. 2 , standard i
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity;
Ž. 2 Absolute values of ratios are beneath coefficient estimates;
Ž. 3 Family income coefficients are in scientific notation;
Ž. 4 Gender  1 if male, 0 if female.
a Significant at the 0.10 level.
b Significant at the 0.05 level.
Column 1 in Table IV presents the descriptive statistics for the regressors. The
sample statistics indicate that the average subject was 24.22 years old, received 6.78
Christmas presents, and had a family income of $68,472. Males comprised 58% of
the sample.
Ž. Columns 2 and 3 in Table IV contain summary regression estimates of Eq. 3 .
Ž. Given that the dependent variable in Eq. 3 consists of estimated person-specific
fixed effects, which can introduce heteroscedasticity of an unknown form, the t
statistics reported in Table IV use the White heteroscedasticity correction. Regres-
sion diagnostics suggest that both models are significant at conventional levels, and
across specifications parameter estimates are similar. Focusing on the open-ended
survey results in column 2, we find that the fixed effects are at least partially
determined by demographic factors, as some coefficients are significantly different
from zero at conventional levels. More specifically, the evidence suggests that a
person was more likely to understate a real offer if he or she was older, a man, or
had received more gifts.
15 For example, the coefficient of GIFTS suggests that
for each extra gift received, the fixed effect,  , is increased by $14.90or i
equivalently, to provide a more accurate predictor of actual behavior, the subject’s
hypothetical value needs to be adjusted upward by $14.90 for each additional gift
he or she receives. This finding suggests that hypothetical auctions do not necessar-
ily provide incentives for people to work through the cognitive processes to
evaluate each and every good seriously. Overall, our general observations are
 consistent with the psychology findings discussed in Krosnick 33 . Although
15 We should note, however, that using a one-sided alternative the coefficients of AGE and
GENDER are only significant at the p  0.07 level.CALIBRATION OF WTA 231
intuition suggests people should play it safe by stating large WTA values when
Ž their actions or preferences are not well thought out e.g., Hoehn and Randall
 . 28 , our results suggest otherwise.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Calibration research may eventually lead to generalizations about behavior that
converts experimental results into theory. Such a conversion requires we under-
stand how people behave across both WTP and WTA scenarios. Although WTP
statements have been examined thoroughly, much less has been done in the area of
compensation demanded. In this study, we fill this gap by using data from List and
 Shogren’s 38 study of gift-giving. Our raw data from a within-subject experimental
design suggest that people understated their real WTA in the hypothetical regimes,
framed both as demand and non-demand revealing. After controlling for person-
specific effects, however, hypothetical and real statements are equivalent on the
margin: a one dollar increase in a hypothetical valuation statement is associated
with a one dollar increase in actual value.
Calibration studies have thus far been a series of exercises in pattern recogni-
tion. One result suggests people understate real WTP; another finds people
overstate WTP; and still another observes neither. Why? Is it the exchange
institution? The subject pool? The good? The context? All of the above? The
answer is not immediately obvious, and it is unanswered questions like these that
continue to make the gap between intentions and actions an irascible issue in
non-market valuation. This is probably because the perception of a hypothetical
stain has never really been systematically removed by an industrial-strength theory
Ž . in over two decades of debate. We agree with Mansfield’s 41 , p. 680 point that
‘‘the power of the calibration model could be improved by a better understanding
of how individuals answer CV questions, including the traits or attitudes that
inspire individuals to give more or less accurate answers.’’ No camp has a
completely convincing and axiomatic explanation as to what creates or removes the
wedge between intentions and actions. The debate will likely be palliated only
when a robust theoretical or behavioral reason emerges as to why the wedge
happens and whether it can be controlled systematically. Designing an experiment
to understand whether a model of context-dependent preferences can help orga-
nize behavior in valuation exercises is the next step in our research program.
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